In this paper, we introduce the Banzhaf power indices for simple games on convex geometries. We define the concept of swing for these structures, obtaining convex swings. The number of convex swings and the number of coalitions such that a player is an extreme point are the basic tools to define the convex Banzhaf indices, one normalized and other probabilistic. We obtain a family of axioms that give rise to the Banzhaf indices. In the last section, we present a method to calculate the convex Banzhaf indices with the computer program Mathematica, and we apply this to compute power indices in the Spanish and Catalan parliaments and in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. 
Introduction
The analysis of power is central in political science. In general, it is difficult to define the idea of power, but for the special case of voting power there are mathematical power indices that have been used. The first such power index was proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) . Another concept for measuring voting power was introduced by Banzhaf (1965) , a lawyer, whose work has appeared mainly in law journals, and whose index has been used in arguments in various legal proceedings. In this paper, we introduce the Banzhaf power index for cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will study the structure of such allowable coalitions using the theory of convex geometries, a notion developed to combinatorially abstract geometric convexity. The Shapley-Shubik index and the Shapley value on these structures are studied by Bilbao and Edelman (1998) , and Edelman (1998) . We will define the Banzhaf index and generalize it to the Banzhaf value on convex geometries.
N
Let N be a finite set of n elements and + # 2 . Edelman and Jamison (1985) introduced the convex geometry as the pair (N, +) where the following axioms hold:
1. 5 [ +, and + is closed under intersection. 2. If S [ + and S ± N, then there exists j [ N\S such that S < j [ +.
Axiom 1 implies that intersections of feasible coalitions should also be feasible, since the players agree on a profile of cooperation. In the model of conference structures by Myerson (1980) , two players are connected if they can be coordinated by meeting in separate conferences which have some members in common to serve as intermediaries. In our model, the coalitions of intermediaries are in the cooperation structure. N A maximal chain of + # 2 is an ordered collection of convex sets that is not contained in any larger chain. From Axiom 2 and by induction, Edelman and Jamison (1985) showed that every maximal chain contains n 1 1 convex sets
and the cardinal uS u5k, for all k50, 1, . . . ,n. Thus, the hierarchical situations (see k Moulin and Shenker, 1996) , when users pay their incremental costs according to a ordering of N, can be modeled by convex geometries. A simple game on a convex geometry +#2 is a set function v:+→h0, 1j, such that v(5)50, and v is monotone (v(S)#v(T ), whenever S #T ). The collection of the simple games on + is denoted by V(+).
then we say that v is superadditive. This collection of games is denoted by V (+). On sa the set V(+) we define the internal operations meet ∧ and join ∨ by
h j h ĵÎ n V (+) the operation join is not internal. The games 1 and 0 are simple games such sât hat 1(S)51, and 0(S)50, for every nonempty S [+.
Example. We consider the set of players N5h1, 2, . . . ,2k11j and let + be the 2k 11 convex geometry whose convex sets are the empty set and the intervals [i, j] 5hi, i 11, . . . , j21, jj. The game v, defined by order (see Edelman, 1998 Nouweland and Borm (1991) . Let G5(N, E) be a connected block graph and let us consider the collection and Jamison (1985) showed that + is a convex geometry.
Fundamental concepts
Convex coalitions S [+ with v(S)51 are called winning and convex coalitions with v(S)50 losing. In the classical theory (see Dubey and Shapley, 1979) a swing for player i is a pair of coalitions (S, S\i) such that S is winning and S\i is not. This concept allows us to define convex swings for games on convex geometries.
Definition 2. For a player i and a game v, we say that the pair (S, S\i) is a convex swing if S [+, i [ex(S), v(S) 51, v(S\i) 50. The number of convex swings of player i is denoted by cs (v), and the total number of convex swings for game v is Bilbao, 1998) .
The issue under consideration can be summed up thus: There are two different models for situations in which not all coalitions are allowable. In the present paper, we study an extremal model in which the power of a player depends on his extremal position in the feasible and winning coalitions. Another model, the restricted model, considers that the power of a player is related with the number of feasible winning coalitions such that the player is a cutvertex in a communication graph.
In the extremal model, it is obvious that the convex coalitions where a player is extreme are the only coalitions to take part in the game. The following numbers will usually appear,
The number % will be called extremal power of the player i and % (T ) is the extremal We consider the relationship between the convex swings of a player and the set of all convex coalitions such that the player i is an extreme point.
Definition 3. For every player i [N, the number
is called convex swing probability of i for the game v. The sum of all these numbers is denoted cs9 (v) . The pair (S, S\i) is a convex swing if and only if [v(S)2v(S\i)]51. Therefore, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Let v[V(+) and i
Notice that a dummy player can never help a convex coalition to win. For any S [+, S ±5 the unanimity game on S is the superadditive simple game defined by 
Proof. By Proposition 1 we have 
The interest of these numbers lies in their ratios and it has been useful to normalize them with the total number of swings (see Dubey and Shapley, 1979) . Another possibility is to consider the measure given by the expected number of convex swings 
and we can show that cb (v) is a probabilistic index because
The relation of these indices with the internal operations of V(+) is the transfer property. 
Proof. In the following table we observe that (v∨w)1(v∧w) 
]] w (z ) 5 w (z ).
The last axiom is based on the transfer property.
Axiom 4. Transfer: If v, w[V(+) then w(v) 1 w(w) 5 w(v ∨ w) 1 w(v ∧ w).
We will now prove that the normalized and probabilistic convex Banzhaf indices can be characterized with these axioms. In the next theorem, the normalized index is not obtained directly by Axiom 4 (see Remark 1).
Theorem 1. There exists a unique function w that satisfies the dummy, total swings, extremal power and transfer axioms. Moreover,
1 ]] cb(v) 5 w(v), for all v [ V(+ ).
cs(v)

Proof. Let S be a convex coalition, if j [ ⁄ ex(S) then j is a dummy in z and Axiom 1
S implies O w (z ) 5 O w (z ). i S j S i [N j [ex(S ) If i [
ex(S) then S [hT [+: i [ex(T )j and S $S, hence % (S)±0 and by Axiom 3a we
i obtain that
Therefore, w is uniquely determined over the unanimity game since Axiom 2a leads us to
Using Proposition 3 we show that O % (S) 5 cs(z ) and % (S) 5 cs (z ).
So, we obtain w (z )5cs (z ).
i S i S
Finally, we can extend w for all V(+) applying Axiom 4, because the calculation of i w (v) can be reduced to w (z ). Let S , . . . ,S be the minimal winning convex coalitions
. By using the monotonicity of v and the decomposition showed by Dubey and Shapley (1979) , we obtain
and this is the unique decomposition of v given by the operation join in V(+). By the transfer axiom,
Each game that appears in the second member is a game with fewer minimal winning convex coalitions than v. So, we can perform an induction on the number of minimal winning convex coalitions. If v50, then all the players are dummy and thereforê w (0)50. We have proved the uniqueness and the existence is obtained because the i vector of components cs (v) satisfies the axioms. h i We obtain the probabilistic convex Banzhaf index with a similar proof.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique function w that satisfies the dummy, total swing probabilities, relative extremal power and transfer axioms. Moreover, cb9(v)5w(v), for all v in V(+).
Remark 2. We can restrict V (+) if the transfer property is applicable to those games sa of V (+) such that the operation join applied to them belongs to V (+).
sa sa Proposition 5. Let v be the majority simple game on the convex geometry + . Then, 2k 11
The normalized convex Banzhaf indices are
1 ]] cb (v) 5 , if i ± k 1 1 i 2k 1 2 1 ]] cb (v) 5 , if i 5 k 1 1. i k 1 1
The probabilistic convex Banzhaf indices are
Proof.
(1) This formula is showed by Edelman (1998) . (2) 
The dummy, total swing probabilities, extremal power axioms and, in this case, also the linearity axiom, hold for this value. 
The Banzhaf indices computed with Mathematica
The package DiscreteMath'Combinatorica' extends the program Mathematica to combinatorics and graph theory. The best guide of this package is the book by Skiena (1990) . The package Cooperative.m included in Carter (1993) F 5 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 1, 2 , 2, 3 , 3, 4 , 4, 5 , 1, 2, 3 , 2, 3, 4 , hh j h j h j h j h j h j h j h j h j h j h j h j 3, 4, 5 , 1, 2, 3, 4 , 2, 3, 4, 5 , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ; h j h j h j h jj
The convex geometry + is shown in Fig. 1 . We will analyze two voting games, the first is the simple majority rule in the Spanish parliament (176 out of 350 votes), the second is the simple majority rule in the Catalan parliament (68 out of 135 votes). In both cases, the convex geometry is + , that is, the n convex coalitions comprise parties that are adjacent to one another in the left-right ordering. First, we obtain the convex Banzhaf indices for the 11 political parties with seats in the present Spanish parliament (1996-) . The voting game is defined by Clear [x, y, v] H J , , , 0, 0 . 5 5 5
The Banzhaf power in the European Union
We will now study the voting power in the Council of Ministers of the Europeań Union. Herne and Nurmi (1993) ; Widgren (1994) and Lane and Maeland (1995) have studied the power indices (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) in the EU Council. In our model, we also consider the convex geometry of the connected subgraphs of a communication situation defined by the graph in Fig. 2 . There are two blocks containing the following countries: GE, BE, NE, LU, AU, SW, FI, DE and FR, IT, SP, GR, PO, IR , h j h j and a bridge between them with hIR, UK, DEj. Banzhaf power indices. The majority voting rule is assumed to be 62 and 65 out of 87 votes in the EU Council.
